Safety assessment of a future taxi into position and hold operation by agent-based dynamic risk modelling by Stroeve, S.H. et al.
 
NLR-TP-2013-489 
 
SAFETY ASSESSMENT OF A FUTURE TAXI 
INTO POSITION AND HOLD OPERATION BY 
AGENT-BASED DYNAMIC RISK MODELLING 
  
   
S.H. Stroeve 
B.A. van Doorn 
G.J. Bakker 
 
 
Anthony Fokkerweg 2, 1059 CM  Amsterdam, P.O. Box 90502,1006 BM Amsterdam, The Netherlands
T: +31 88 511 35 00, F: +31 88 511 32 10, E: info@nlr-atsi.nl, I : www.nlr-atsi.nl
NLR-TP-2013-489 
 
 
Executive summary 
 
 
 
 
UNCLASSIFIED 
 
This report is based on an article published in Journal of Aerospace 
Operations 1 (2012) 107-127 by IOS Press. 
 
Report no. 
NLR-TP-2013-489 
 
Author(s) 
S.H. Stroeve 
B.A. van Doorn 
G.J. Bakker 
 
Report classification 
UNCLASSIFIED 
 
Date 
October 2013 
 
Knowledge area(s) 
Vliegveiligheid (safety & 
security) 
     
Descriptor(s) 
safety 
multi-agent system 
dynamic risk model 
air traffic management 
TOPAZ 
     
SAFETY ASSESSMENT OF A FUTURE TAXI INTO POSITION 
AND HOLD OPERATION BY AGENT-BASED DYNAMIC RISK 
MODELLING 
  
 
 
Problem area 
Agent-based dynamic risk 
modelling supports the design 
of future air traffic operations by 
risk analysis methods that 
account for the performance 
variability of the interacting 
operators and systems, and the 
resulting emergence of safety 
occurrences. 
 
Description of work 
The paper shows the application 
of this modelling approach in a 
risk assessment cycle of a future 
A-SMGCS level 3 supported 
taxiing into position and hold 
operation. 
 
Results and conclusions 
Accident risk results have been 
obtained by Monte Carlo 
simulations of a multi-agent 
dynamic risk model. The 
uncertainty in the risk has been 
evaluated using sensitivity 
analysis and feedback of 
operational experts. 
 
Applicability 
Safety assessment of air traffic 
operations. 
 
NLR-TP-2013-489 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UNCLASSIFIED 
 
 
NLR Air Transport Safety Institute 
 
Anthony Fokkerweg 2, 1059 CM Amsterdam, 
P.O. Box 90502, 1006 BM  Amsterdam, The Netherlands 
Telephone +31 88 511 35 00, Fax +31 88 511 32 10, Web site: http://www.nlr-atsi.nl 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
NLR-TP-2013-489 
 
SAFETY ASSESSMENT OF A FUTURE TAXI 
INTO POSITION AND HOLD OPERATION BY 
AGENT-BASED DYNAMIC RISK MODELLING 
  
   
S.H. Stroeve 
B.A. van Doorn 
G.J. Bakker 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This report is based on an article published in Journal of Aerospace Operations 1 (2012) 
107-127 by IOS Press 
 
The contents of this report may be cited on condition that full credit is given to NLR and 
the authors. 
 
 
Customer National Aerospace Laboratory NLR 
Owner National Aerospace Laboratory NLR 
Division Air Transport 
Distribution Unlimited 
Classification of title Unclassified 
 October 2013 
Approved by: 
Author 
S.H. Stroeve 
 
 
 
 
Reviewer 
External anonymous review 
 
 
 
 
Managing department 
A.D.J. Rutten 
 
 
 
 
Date: Date: Date: 

  
 
 
 
  
NLR-TP-2013-489 
October 2013 v 
 
 
SUMMARY 
Agent-based dynamic risk modelling supports the design of future air traffic 
operations by risk analysis methods that account for the performance variability 
of the interacting operators and systems, and the resulting emergence of safety 
occurrences. The paper shows the application of this modelling approach in a 
risk assessment cycle of a future A-SMGCS level 3 supported taxiing into position 
and hold operation. Accident risk results have been obtained by Monte Carlo 
simulations of a multi-agent dynamic risk model. The uncertainty in the risk has 
been evaluated using sensitivity analysis and feedback of operational experts. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
To improve future air traffic management (ATM) for accommodating expected 
increases in air transport, research and development programmes as SESAR and 
NextGen focus on development and deployment of next generation ATM in 
Europe and USA. For instance, the European ATM Master Plan aims to 
accommodate a 73% increase in flights by 2020 (w.r.t. 2005) and a further 
capacity increase beyond [1]. Such capacity increases should be attained while 
targets for other key performance indicators are respected. In particular, for 
safety it is demanded [1] that “the total numbers of ATM induced accidents and 
serious or risk bearing incidents will not increase despite traffic growth”. As a 
way towards increasing the ATM capacity, the RESET project [2] of the European 
Commission 6th Framework Programme aims to identify safe reductions in 
separation minima. In the RESET project several potential separation standard 
modifications have been suggested, including new procedures and systems for a 
taxi into position and hold (TIPH) operation. The phraseology standard of the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) for this operation is “line up and 
wait”.   
 
The safety of current as well as of future air traffic operations depends on 
complex and distributed interactions between human operators and technical 
systems, where the interactions are knowledge intensive and highly regulated by 
procedures. Following a long tradition in safety assessment of technical systems, 
air traffic operations are often assessed on the basis of fault and event trees. 
Fault and event trees are pictorial representations of Boolean logic relations 
between success and failure types of events. Event trees use forward logic, 
reasoning from an initiating event to its possible consequences; fault trees use 
backward logic, reasoning from a top event to its contributing causes. Here, risk 
quantification is based on (conditional) event probabilities. Recent views on 
accident causation indicate that fault and event trees may not be adequate to 
represent the complexity of modern socio-technical systems [3]-[5]. Key 
determinants of this complexity include the number and variety of organizational 
entities (human, groups, technical systems), the number and types of 
interdependencies between organizational entities, the degree of distribution of 
the entities (single/multiple locations), the types of dynamic performance of the 
entities (static/slow/fast), and the number and types of hazards in the 
organization. Limitations of fault and event trees include the difficultness to 
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represent the large number of interdependencies between organizational entities 
and the dynamics of these interdependencies.   
 
As a way forward, it was argued that for managing safety risk and resilience in 
complex socio-technical organizations, there is a need for analysis methods that 
account for the performance variability of the interacting humans and systems 
and the resulting emergence of safety occurrences [3]-[5]. Systemic accident 
modelling methods such as Functional Resonance Accident Model (FRAM) [5], 
Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) [4] and Traffic 
Organization and Perturbation AnalyZer (TOPAZ) [6] have been developed in 
support of this need. The latter approach has been developed uniquely for the 
assessment of air traffic safety and it includes agent-based dynamic risk 
modelling, Monte Carlo simulation and uncertainty evaluation for assessment of 
risk probability levels [6]-[9]. 
 
It is the aim of this paper to highlight the TOPAZ steps in the risk assessment of 
the TIPH operation considered in the RESET project and to provide preliminary 
risk assessment results. The paper presents the model development for a 
particular TIPH scenario, the attained collision risk results and the parameter 
uncertainty in these results. Section II introduces the risk assessment cycle 
applied for the TIPH operation and summarizes earlier obtained results for its 
first steps. Section III describes the development of the dynamic risk model 
(DRM) of a TIPH scenario. Section IV provides a detailed account of risk point 
estimates arrived at by Monte Carlo simulations of the DRM. Section V gives an 
account of the methods and results for evaluation of the uncertainty in the risk 
results. Section VI provides results on the tolerability of the risk levels, the main 
safety bottlenecks and measures that have been identified in order to reduce the 
risk. Section VII discusses the results of this research. 
 
Earlier exposure of the research in this paper was achieved at conferences [10], 
[11]. 
 
  
 
 
 
  
NLR-TP-2013-489 
October 2013 3 
 
 
2 RISK ASSESSMENT CYCLE 
Figure 1 shows an overview of the steps in the safety risk assessment cycle [9]. In 
Step 0, the objective of the assessment is determined, as well as the safety 
context, the scope and the level of detail of the assessment. Step 1 serves to 
obtain a complete overview of the operation. Next, hazards associated with the 
operation are identified (Step 2), and aggregated into safety relevant scenarios 
(Step 3). Using severity and frequency assessments (Steps 4 and 5), the safety 
risk associated with each safety relevant scenario is classified (Step 6). For each 
safety relevant scenario with a (possibly) unacceptable safety risk, the main 
sources contributing to the lack of safety (safety bottlenecks) are identified (Step 
7). The main results of the risk assessment cycle are the assessed risk levels and 
the identified safety bottlenecks. These results support decision making about 
the acceptability of the operation and identification of mitigating measures or 
improvements in the operation design. If the design is changed, a new safety risk 
assessment cycle of the operation should be performed in order to investigate 
how much the risk posed by previous safety issues has been decreased, but also 
to assess any new safety issues that may have been introduced by the intended 
enhancements themselves.  
 
Decision 
making
Determine 
operation1
Assess risk 
tolerability6
Identify 
severities4
Identify safety 
bottlenecks7
Assess 
frequency5
Construct 
scenarios3Identifyhazards2
Iterate
(option)
Identify 
objective0
Operational
development
 
Figure 1: Steps in the safety risk assessment cycle 
 
In the safety assessment of the RESET TIPH operation, Steps 0 to 4 served as a 
starting point for the development of a DRM. Key results of these steps are 
highlighted next, their details are presented in Ref. [12]. 
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Step 0: Identify objective 
In Step 0 safety criteria for the TIPH operation were derived. The approach 
followed was based on worldwide accident data for the ATC sub-products 
landing, line-up and take off [13]. The acquired target level of safety includes a 
risk reduction ambition factor of two, leading to a maximum accident risk of 
3.7E-9 per flight for the TIPH operation. 
 
Step 1: Determine operation 
In Step 1 a description of the operational concept was obtained. This 
consolidated description serves as a starting point of the safety assessment.  
The TIPH operation aims at placing an aircraft on the mixed mode runway, ready 
for immediate departure as soon as no other restrictions apply and the departure 
clearance can be issued by the air traffic controller. An aircraft that has been 
cleared to taxi into position and hold can enter the runway after the aircraft 
currently using the runway (either landing or taking-off) has passed the waiting 
aircraft’s position. Thus, the time between issuance of the departure clearance 
and actual start of the take-off roll can be reduced as the line-up is conducted 
while another aircraft is completing its landing or take-off. The TIPH procedure is 
applied during all visibility conditions (visibility condition 1 to 4, Ref. [14]). 
During visibility conditions 2, 3 and 4 A-SMGCS level 3 equipment is required. In 
this case, the A-SMGCS equipment includes automatic switching off the stopbar 
when the aircraft currently using the runway has passed the waiting aircraft, 
automatic detection of runway incursions using ATC surveillance data, uplink of 
ATC surveillance data (including runway incursion alerts) by traffic information 
service-broadcast (TIS-B), and presentation of this surveillance data on the 
cockpit display of traffic information (CDTI). 
 
Step 2: Identify hazards 
In Step 2 hazards were identified using hazard databases and hazard 
brainstorming sessions with pilots and controllers. Some additional hazards were 
identified during the scenario construction of Step 3. In total 153 hazards were 
identified [12], including e.g. ‘wrong red stopbar is switched off’, ‘wrong aircraft 
identified’, ‘R/T frequency congestion’, ‘pilot validates without checking’, ‘pilot 
unfamiliar with airport’, etc. 
 
Step 3: Construct scenarios 
In Step 3 safety relevant scenarios were constructed using the hazards identified 
in Step 2. These scenarios represent relations between events/conditions that 
may lead to potentially hazardous air traffic situations in the TIPH operation and 
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events/conditions that may hamper resolution of these air traffic situations. Eight 
scenarios were identified [12], including conflict scenario 1 (CS-1) that describes 
the conflict between an aircraft landing and an aircraft lining up while it should 
not (see Figure 2). The other scenarios describe various conflict conditions 
between aircraft taxiing, landing, having landed and taking off.  
     
Step 4: Identify severities 
In step 4 all the safety relevant scenarios for TIPH were assessed in terms of 
severity. It was concluded that all eight scenarios can potentially result in an 
accident. It was argued [12] that CS-1 represents one of the more risky scenarios 
of the TIPH operation and that its risk budget should be 1.1E-9 accidents per 
flight, which is about 30% of the total target level of safety of the TIPH operation. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Schematic representation of CS-1, which considers the conflict between an 
aircraft landing with an aircraft lining up while it should not. 
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3 DYNAMIC RISK MODELLING OF TIPH 
SCENARIO 
3.1 AGENT-BASED DYNAMIC RISK MODEL 
Building forward on the results of Steps 1 to 4, the development of a dynamic 
risk model (DRM) was focused on the conflict scenario involving a landing aircraft 
and a taxiing aircraft, which is lining up on the runway while it should not (Figure 
2). The development of a dynamic risk model of an air traffic scenario is based 
on a mathematical modelling approach, which uniquely defines the stochastic 
dynamics of the related agents (human operators and technical systems). This 
approach uses a stochastic dynamic extension of the Petri net formalism to 
develop an hierarchically structured representation of the agents in the air traffic 
scenario [15].  
 
Figure 3. Agents in the DRM of the TIPH operation. 
 
For CS-1 of the TIPH operation, the dynamic risk model includes the agents 
shown in Figure 3: the landing aircraft, the taxiing aircraft, the pilots of the 
landing aircraft, the pilots of the taxiing aircraft, the avionics of the landing 
aircraft, the avionics of the taxiing aircraft, the ATC system and the airport and 
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environment. For all these agents, one or more Local Petri Nets (LPNs) are 
defined, which describe the agents’ performance and interactions. A high-level 
description of these LPNs is presented next per agent; more details are reported 
in Ref. [16].     
 
Landing Aircraft 
The performance of the agent Landing Aircraft is modelled by two LPNs: 
• Characteristics – This describes the aircraft type, its size and its landing 
reference speed. The aircraft type may be a medium jet or a large jet. The 
landing reference speed is chosen from a probability distribution that 
accounts for weight variances. 
• Evolution – This describes the evolution of the aircraft during final approach, 
landing, taxiing on the runway and missed approach. The aircraft descends 
along the glide scope from the final approach fix to the runway threshold 
with lateral and vertical deviations chosen from the ICAO Collision Risk Model 
[17] (CRM). The aircraft flies with a constant calibrated air speed from the 
final approach fix up to the outer marker, it decelerates to its final approach 
speed between the outer marker and the deceleration point, and it 
progresses with a constant calibrated air speed to the runway threshold; the 
achieved ground speed depends on the wind. The aircraft may initiate a 
missed approach. The nominal missed approach path is aligned with the 
runway, but the achieved missed approach path includes lateral deviations in 
line with the ICAO CRM. The vertical missed approach path includes a speed-
dependent initial height loss and a constant rate of climb thereafter. At the 
runway threshold, when the aircraft commences the landing, it is always at 
the nominal height of the instrument landing system and during the landing 
it has no lateral deviations with respect to the runway centreline. During the 
transition phase the aircraft descends with constant speed along a circle 
segment until touchdown. After touchdown the aircraft decelerates to taxi 
speed and then it progresses with constant speed on the runway. The 
evolution of the landing aircraft (and thereby of the conflict scenario) is 
ended when it has passed the position of the taxiing aircraft. 
 
Taxiing Aircraft 
The performance of the agent Taxiing Aircraft is modelled by two LPNs: 
• Characteristics – This describes the aircraft type and its size. The aircraft type 
may be a medium jet or a large jet. 
• Evolution – This describes the evolution of the aircraft during the taxi into 
position and hold operation as well as during manoeuvres to avoid a 
collision. At the start of the conflict scenario, the aircraft is located in front of 
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the stopbar, where it may be holding or have a line-up speed. The time at 
which the taxiing aircraft initiates to taxi into position is uniformly 
distributed in the time frame during which TIPH is not allowed (i.e. when the 
landing aircraft has passed a minimum distance to the runway threshold until 
the time that the landing aircraft has passed the taxiing aircraft). The aircraft 
taxies along a straight line to the runway centreline, where it decelerates and 
holds. To avoid a collision, the aircraft may brake or it may taxi off the 
runway.  
 
Pilots Landing Aircraft 
The performance of the agent Pilots Landing Aircraft is modelled by two LPNs: 
• Situation Awareness – This describes the situation awareness status and 
updating processes. The pilots have situation awareness components about 
the position of the ownship and of the taxiing aircraft and about the status of 
the runway incursion alert. The situation awareness of the pilots is updated 
by visual monitoring of the environment, by monitoring of the CDTI or by an 
active runway incursion alert. Both visual and CDTI monitoring are done using 
probabilistic time intervals. The pilots can only visually observe the taxiing 
aircraft if it is within a range in accordance with the visibility condition and 
the process includes a visual observation error. 
• Flight Control – This describes the control of the aircraft by the pilots. The 
control may be for normal final approach and landing, as described for the 
agent Landing Aircraft, or it may be for initiation of a missed approach. The 
pilots initiate a missed approach if they are aware of a runway incursion alert, 
or if they are aware that the taxiing aircraft is within a critical distance to the 
runway centreline and the own aircraft is within a critical distance to the 
runway threshold.     
 
Pilots Taxiing Aircraft 
The performance of the agent Pilots Taxiing Aircraft is modelled by two LPNs: 
• Situation Awareness – This describes the situation awareness status and 
updating processes. The pilots of the taxiing aircraft have situation 
awareness components about the position of the ownship and of the landing 
aircraft, about the status of the runway incursion alert and about their intent 
to hold or line-up. The situation awareness of the pilots is updated by visual 
monitoring of the environment, by monitoring of the CDTI or by an active 
runway incursion alert. Both visual and CDTI monitoring are done using 
probabilistic time intervals. The pilots can only visually observe the landing 
aircraft if it is within a range in accordance with the visibility condition and 
the process includes a visual observation error. If the stopbar on the entry of 
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the taxiing aircraft is off, the pilots instantaneously intend to line-up on the 
runway. Furthermore, the pilots may intend to line-up due to some human 
error (e.g. communication problem, misunderstanding, misinterpretation of 
the stopbar status) irrespective of the status of the stopbar. 
• Flight Control – This describes the control of the aircraft by the pilots. The 
pilots may control a line-up process such as described for the Taxiing Aircraft 
agent; taxi speed, acceleration and deceleration are chosen from probability 
distributions. The pilots recognize a conflict with the landing aircraft if they 
are aware of a runway incursion alert or if they are aware that the landing 
aircraft is within a critical distance to the runway threshold. Given conflict 
awareness, the pilots stop taxiing if they are aware to be not yet within a 
critical distance to the runway centreline or if they are not aware of their own 
position, and they start to taxi off the runway if they are aware to be within a 
critical distance to the runway centreline.  
 
Avionics Landing Aircraft & Avionics Taxiing Aircraft 
The performance of the agents Avionics Landing Aircraft and Avionics Taxiing 
Aircraft are both modelled by three LPNs: 
• TIS-B Local – This describes the local component of the TIS-B communication 
with the aircraft, including the TIS-B receiver. It may be working nominally at 
a constant sampling rate, interruptingly or not.  
• CDTI Availability – This describes the availability of the CDTI (up / down). If it 
is down, the uplinked information as known by the avionics cannot be 
transferred to the pilots.  
• Situation Awareness – This describes the uplinked traffic information as 
known by the avionics. This uplinked information includes the position of the 
other aircraft and the status of the runway incursion alert. 
 
ATC System  
The performance of the agent ATC System is modelled by six LPNs: 
• Surveillance – This describes the radar surveillance of aircraft movements on 
the airport surface and during final approach. The radar surveillance may be 
working nominally, it may have false tracks or it may not be working at all. 
Nominally, the aircraft are regularly tracked, including normal surveillance 
track errors. The false track mode for the landing aircraft represents the 
situation that it is (falsely) positioned past the entry of the taxiing aircraft 
while it is actually in front of it. The false track mode for the taxiing aircraft 
represents the situation that it is (falsely) positioned in front of the stopbar 
while it is actually behind it. 
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• RIA Availability – This describes the availability of the runway incursion 
alerting system (up / down). 
• RIA Mode – This describes the status of the runway incursion alert. A runway 
incursion alert can only become active if the runway incursion alert system is 
available and the surveillance system works nominally. A runway incursion 
alert is specified if the ATC position estimate of the taxiing aircraft is within a 
critical distance to the runway centreline and the ATC position estimate of the 
landing aircraft has passed a critical distance with respect to the runway 
threshold. 
• Stopbar Availability – This describes the availability of the remotely controlled 
stopbar at the entry point of the taxiing aircraft (up / down).  
• Stopbar Mode – This describes the status of the remotely controlled stopbar 
at the entry point of the taxiing aircraft. The stopbar is switched off in the 
case of a technical system failure or if the surveillance system signals that a 
landing aircraft has passed the runway entry, e.g. due to a false track of the 
landing aircraft. 
• TIS-B Global – This describes the global component of the TIS-B 
communication (up-link) with the landing and taxiing aircraft (up / down).  
 
Airport and Environment 
The performance of the agent Airport and Environment is modelled by three 
LPNs: 
• Visibility – This describes the visibility condition during a scenario. Three 
visibility conditions are considered: VC1, VC2 and a combination of VC3 and 
VC4.  The visibility conditions are represented by maximum viewing 
distances in the horizontal plane.    
• Runway – This describes the layout and usage of the runway and its entries. If 
the landing aircraft is at least a minimum distance away from the runway 
threshold, a taxi into position and hold operation is allowed and otherwise it 
is not. The TIPH scenario is considered for an entry taxiway at 500 m from 
the runway threshold. 
• Wind – This describes the wind during the scenario. The wind at reference 
height is chosen stochastically; its height dependence is according to the JAR-
AWO wind shear model 1. 
 
3.2 RISK DECOMPOSITION 
As air traffic is a very safe means of transport, the risk of collision between two 
aircraft is extremely low. The assessment of such low collision risk values 
through straightforward Monte Carlo simulation of a DRM would need extremely 
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lengthy computer simulation periods. Therefore, speed-up of Monte Carlo 
simulations is required, which may be achieved by risk decomposition. This 
consists of decomposing accident risk simulations in a sequence of conditional 
Monte Carlo simulations and combining the results of these conditional 
simulations into the assessed collision risk value. To this end, we use stochastic 
analysis tools to model and analyse the stochastic event sequences (including 
dependent events) and the conditional probabilities of such event sequences in 
stochastic dynamic processes. The risk decomposition for the developed DRM is 
based on the following components. 
• The common (ATC) component of up-link of ATC surveillance data is working 
or is not working, denoted by commonSurvUpl,tκ ∈ {Up, Down}. 
• The ATC Surveillance Tracking system can be functioning nominally, it can 
have a false track for the landing aircraft, it can have a false track for the 
taxiing aircraft, or it can be down, denoted by commonTracking,tκ ∈ {Nominal, False-L, 
False-T, Down}. 
• The ATC surveillance runway incursion alert system may be working well or 
not, denoted by commonRIAS,tκ ∈ {Up, Down}.  
• The avionics of the landing aircraft supporting up-link and presentation to 
the pilots of ATC surveillance data may be working or not, denoted by 
ac,L
Avionics,tκ ∈{Up, Down}.  
• The avionics of the taxiing aircraft supporting up-link and presentation to the 
pilots of ATC surveillance data may be working or not, denoted by 
ac,T
Avionics,tκ ∈{Up, Down}.  
• The intent of the pilots of the taxiing aircraft may be to hold or to line-up, 
denoted by ac,TIntent,tκ ∈ {Hold, Line-up}. The latter condition refers to the conflict 
scenario considered in this risk assessment. 
• The visibility may be in either one the three conditions: 1, 2, or 3 and 4 
combined, denoted by commonVisibility,tκ ∈ {VC1, VC2, VC3/4}. 
Combination of all risk decomposition conditions of the conflict scenario leads to 
192 combinations, i.e. 64 combinations per visibility condition. Since the ATC 
surveillance runway incursion alert system does not provide an alert, if the ATC 
surveillance system is down or if it has a false track of the landing or taxiing 
aircraft, there remain 120 combinations of independent risk decomposition 
conditions (40 per visibility condition). The Monte Carlo simulations provide risk 
estimates for all these cases. 
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4 RISK POINT ESTIMATE RESULTS 
Based on the developed DRM and the associated risk decomposition, various 
sessions of Monte Carlo simulations were performed. Per risk decomposition 
condition up to 1 million simulation runs were done or less if sufficient collisions 
had been counted. Overall results for the risk contributions of the considered 
visibility conditions to the total risk are shown in Table 1 below. It follows from 
Table 1 that the conditional collision risk given a particular visibility condition 
increases with about a factor three for the poorer visibility in VC2 with respect to 
VC1 as well as for VC3/4 with respect to VC2. Accounting for the assumed 
probabilities of the visibility conditions it reads in Table 1 that the largest 
contribution to the total risk stems from VC1 and the contributions from VC2 
and VC3/4 are similar. 
 
Table 1: Risk point estimates for the considered visibility conditions. 
Visibility 
condition 
Probability 
of VC 
Risk point estimate 
given VC 
Contribution to total risk 
VC1 0.95 1.46E-8 1.39E-8 81% 
VC2 0.04 4.63E-8 1.85E-9 11% 
VC3/4 0.01 1.32E-7 1.32E-9 8% 
Total 1 1.71E-8 1.71E-8 100% 
 
In addition to the visibility conditions, the risk decomposition is based on 
conditions for the ATC component of the data uplink, the ATC surveillance 
system, the ATC runway incursion alert system, the avionics of either aircraft and 
the intent of the pilots of the taxiing aircraft. Table 2 to Table 5 provide results 
for all relevant combinations of these conditions, aggregated over the visibility 
conditions. Table 2 shows the probabilities of the combinations of conditions for 
the conflict scenario, i.e. all the cases when the pilots of the taxiing aircraft have 
the intent situation awareness to line-up. Table 3 shows the conditional collision 
risks given these cases. Table 4 shows the contributions of these cases to the 
collision risk (i.e. the multiplication of the figures in Table 2 and Table 3). Table 
5 shows the relative contributions of these cases to the total collision risk. The 
highlights of the results in these tables include the following: 
• The sum of the probabilities in Table 2 is 2.71E-5, implying that according to 
the model overall once in every 37,000 cases that an aircraft is landing and 
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another aircraft is ready to taxi into position and hold, the TIPH is performed 
while it should not, i.e. in front of the landing aircraft.  
• It follows from Table 2 that there are two event combinations that are much 
more likely than all other. Elements R1C1 contributes for 62% of the 
probability of the conflict scenario and it represents the situation that the 
pilots of the taxiing aircraft think that they may line-up as a result of some 
human error (e.g. communication problem, misunderstanding, 
misinterpretation of stopbar status) or a stopbar failure. Element R5C1 
contributes for 36% of the probability of the conflict scenario and it 
represents the situation that the pilots of the taxiing aircraft think that they 
may line-up as result of a switched off stopbar due to a false track of the 
landing aircraft.    
• It follows from Table 4 and Table 5 that by far the largest risk contribution 
stems from the condition that there is a false track of the landing aircraft that 
is positioned past the line-up position (rows R5-R6). The sum of the 
contributions for this condition is 1.69E-8, which is about 99% of the total 
risk. As a result of this particular false track, the stopbar is switched off and 
it thereby initiates the conflict scenario. Moreover, this condition complicates 
the timely recognition of the conflict, since it implies that the runway 
incursion alert does not become active and the landing aircraft is not shown 
properly on the CDTI of the taxiing aircraft.  
• It follows from element R1C1 in Table 4 and Table 5 that the risk for the case 
that all technical systems supporting the operation (avionics, TIS-B, radar, 
RIAS) are working well, contributes only for a very small extent of 5.23E-11 
(0.31%) to the total risk. Table 3 shows that the conditional collision risk for 
this case is such that about one in every 300,000 conflicts would result in a 
collision (aggregated over the visibility conditions). 
• It follows from Table 3 that the functioning of the ATC runway incursion alert 
system has a very large effect on the collision risk. Whereas the conditional 
risk is about 3E-6 if it is functioning well and the alert information can be 
properly uplinked to the aircraft (element R1C1), the conditional risk is in the 
order 1E-3 to 1E-2 if the runway incursion alerts system is not working 
properly (rows R2, R4-R10). 
• It follows from comparison of the conditional risks for the situations that all 
technical systems are working well except for the local component of the 
uplink to either of the aircraft (elements R1C2 and R1C3 in Table 3), that 
failure of the uplink to the taxiing aircraft leads to considerably larger risk 
then failure of the uplink to the landing aircraft. Additional results reveal that 
this difference between both aircraft is especially prominent in good visibility 
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conditions. An explanation of this difference is the more stringent visual 
monitoring performance of the pilots of the landing aircraft. 
• It follows from the similar conditional risks in row R2 of Table 3 that in the 
situation that the ATC runway incursion alert system is not working it does 
not matter whether the up-linking of ATC surveillance data is working or not. 
Since both alerts and position data are normally uplinked, it implies that the 
up-linking of the position data has almost no effect on the collision risk.  
• It follows from comparison of the conditional collision risks in rows R5 & R6 
with those in rows R7 & R8 of Table 3 that given a false track of the landing 
aircraft or of the taxiing aircraft, the conditional risks are similar. Thus, the 
larger contribution of the false track of the landing aircraft observed in Table 
5 is not a result of a larger conditional risk, but due to the fact that it is a 
cause of the conflict scenario itself. 
• It follows from comparison of the conditional collision risks in rows R5 & R7 
with rows R2, R4, R6, R8, R9 & R10 of Table 3 that situations that cause the 
runway incursion alerting to be non-functioning due to a false track lead to 
lower conditional collision risks than non-functioning alerting due to failure 
of the surveillance system or runway incursion alert system. An explanation is 
that the durations of false track situations are shorter than the durations of 
those system failures. 
• It follows from additional results that the conditional collision risks given that 
one or more technical systems fail during the conflict scenario, may be very 
high, especially in poorer visibility conditions. The conditional collision risk 
may be up to 3E-2 in VC1, up to 2E-1 in VC2 and up to 8E-1 in VC3/4. These 
results indicate that especially in VC2 and VC3/4 the avoidance of a collision 
when an aircraft lines up while it should not is very dependent on the well 
functioning of the technical systems (avionics, TIS-B, radar, RIAS); the pilots 
can observe the conflict visually only at a late stage (often too late).      
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Table 2: Probabilities of the combinations of the risk decomposition conditions leading to 
the conflict scenario (i.e. pilots of the taxiing aircraft intend to line-up).  
Probabilities of the 
combinations of conditions 
ac,T
Intentκ  Line-Up 
ac,T
Avionicsκ  Up Down 
ac,L
Avionicsκ  Up Down Up Down 
common
Trackingκ  
common
SurvUplκ  
common
RIASκ   C1 C2 C3 C4 
Nom 
Up 
Up R1 1.67E-5 1.72E-7 1.72E-7 1.77E-9 
Down R2 1.67E-9 1.72E-11 1.72E-11 1.77E-13 
Down 
Up R3 2.33E-9 2.40E-11 2.40E-11 2.48E-13 
Down R4 2.33E-13 2.40E-15 2.40E-15 2.48E-17 
False-L 
Up Down R5 9.80E-6 1.01E-7 1.01E-7 1.04E-9 
Down Down R6 1.37E-9 1.41E-11 1.41E-11 1.46E-13 
False-T 
Up Down R7 1.67E-10 1.72E-12 1.72E-12 1.77E-14 
Down Down R8 2.33E-14 2.40E-16 2.40E-16 2.48E-18 
Down 
Up Down R9 1.67E-10 1.72E-12 1.72E-12 1.77E-14 
Down Down R10 2.33E-14 2.40E-16 2.40E-16 2.48E-18 
Table 3: Conditional collision risks given the cases aggregated over all visibility 
conditions. 
Conditional collision risks 
given the cases 
ac,T
Intentκ  Line-Up 
ac,T
Avionicsκ  Up Down 
ac,L
Avionicsκ  Up Down Up Down 
common
Trackingκ  
common
SurvUplκ  
common
RIASκ   C1 C2 C3 C4 
Nom 
Up 
Up R1 3.13E-06 3.96E-06 6.44E-05 1.16E-04 
Down R2 2.16E-02 2.13E-02 2.21E-02 2.21E-02 
Down 
Up R3 2.45E-02 2.37E-02 2.48E-02 2.57E-02 
Down R4 2.59E-02 2.54E-02 2.60E-02 2.49E-02 
False-L Up 
Down R5 1.68E-03 1.85E-03 1.77E-03 1.75E-03 
Down Down R6 2.49E-02 2.51E-02 2.65E-02 2.58E-02 
False-T Up 
Down R7 1.69E-03 1.65E-03 1.84E-03 1.76E-03 
Down Down R8 2.47E-02 2.45E-02 2.52E-02 2.53E-02 
Down Up 
Down R9 2.42E-02 2.38E-02 2.38E-02 2.30E-02 
Down Down R10 2.51E-02 2.50E-02 2.49E-02 2.49E-02 
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Table 4: Risk contributions of the cases aggregated over all visibility conditions. 
Risk contributions 
of the cases 
ac,T
Intentκ  Line-Up 
ac,T
Avionicsκ  Up Down 
ac,L
Avionicsκ  Up Down Up Down 
common
Trackingκ  
common
SurvUplκ  
common
RIASκ   C1 C2 C3 C4 
Nom 
Up 
Up R1 5.23E-11 6.80E-13 1.11E-11 2.06E-13 
Down R2 3.61E-11 3.67E-13 3.80E-13 3.91E-15 
Down 
Up R3 5.72E-11 5.70E-13 5.96E-13 6.38E-15 
Down R4 6.04E-15 6.10E-17 6.25E-17 6.17E-19 
False-L 
Up Down R5 1.65E-08 1.87E-10 1.78E-10 1.81E-12 
Down Down R6 3.41E-11 3.53E-13 3.74E-13 3.77E-15 
False-T 
Up Down R7 2.82E-13 2.83E-15 3.17E-15 3.11E-17 
Down Down R8 5.77E-16 5.89E-18 6.04E-18 6.27E-20 
Down 
Up Down R9 4.04E-12 4.09E-14 4.09E-14 4.07E-16 
Down Down R10 5.86E-16 6.00E-18 5.98E-18 6.18E-20 
Table 5: Relative risk contributions of the cases aggregated over all visibility conditions. 
Relative risk contributions 
of the cases 
ac,T
Intentκ  Line-Up 
ac,T
Avionicsκ  Up Down 
ac,L
Avionicsκ  Up Down Up Down 
common
Trackingκ  
common
SurvUplκ  
common
RIASκ   C1 C2 C3 C4 
Nom 
Up 
Up R1 0.31% 0.00% 0.06% 0.00% 
Down R2 0.21% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Down 
Up R3 0.33% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Down R4 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
False-L 
Up Down R5 96.68% 1.10% 1.04% 0.01% 
Down Down R6 0.20% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
False-T 
Up Down R7 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Down Down R8 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Down 
Up Down R9 0.02% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Down Down R10 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
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Above results provide insight in the contributions of the conditions used in the 
risk decomposition. Additional insights can be obtained by assessing the risk for 
variations in values of parameters of the DRM. Figure 4 shows the collision risk 
graphs for the various visibility conditions in consideration of variations in six 
parameter values. These parameters reflect the performance of technical systems 
and human operators, as well as the geometry of the runway strip.  
• Figure 4a shows the collision risks as function of the probability of a false 
track of the landing aircraft. It follows that the collision risks are about 
linearly related to the false track probability, since in this parameter range 
the collision risks are almost completely determined by this false track 
condition.  
• Figure 4b shows the collision risks as function of the mean duration of the 
false track of a landing aircraft. It follows that with respect to the nominal 
value of 10 seconds, a decrease has a stronger effect on the risk than an 
increase.  
• Figure 4c shows the collision risks as function of the mean time between 
visual monitoring by the pilots of the taxiing aircraft. The three parameter 
values may be considered as the following cases: 1 second indicates 
monitoring frequently; 17 seconds indicates monitoring once after start of 
line-up; 300 seconds indicates no monitoring after start of line-up. It follows 
from Figure 4c that the total risk decreases by about a factor 10 if monitoring 
would be done frequently rather than once after start of the line-up. The risk 
estimates depend strongly on the visibility condition. In VC1 the risk 
becomes very low, whereas in VC2 and VC3/4 the risk is not very sensitive 
for the monitoring performance. 
• Figure 4d shows the collision risks as function of the distance of the taxiing 
aircraft to the runway centre-line where it is recognized as conflicting by the 
pilots of the landing aircraft. It follows that the collision risk estimates are 
only a bit higher if the decision distance would be 25 m rather than the 
nominal value of 62 m. However, if the conflict would already be recognized 
if the taxiing aircraft would just have passed the stopbar (at 153 m) than the 
total risk would decrease largely. For this large distance, reduced visibility 
(VC2 and VC3/4) has a large effect on the total risk. 
• Figure 4e shows the collision risks as function of the distance of the stopbar 
to the runway centre-line. It follows that the risk increases strongly if the 
stopbar and runway-holding position are closer to the runway. According to 
ICAO Annex 14 the minimum distance of the runway holding point with 
respect to the runway centre-line is 90 m for CAT I, II or III precision 
approaches [19]. For CAT II en III precision approaches the required distance 
may be larger, but no standard distances are specified in ICAO Annex 14, 
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rather they have to be determined based on the size of the ILS critical and 
sensitive areas. A typical distance is CAT II/III runway holding position is just 
outside the runway strip, which has a width of 150 m at both sides of the 
runway centre-line. It follows from Figure 4e that if the stopbar is at the 
minimum distance of 90 m rather than at the typical distance just outside the 
runway strip, then the risk estimate is about a factor 10 higher for all 
visibility conditions. 
• Figure 4f shows the collision risks as function of the distance of the runway 
entry with respect to the runway threshold. It follows that the risk would be 
less if the runway entry would be directly at the runway threshold rather than 
at a more remote position. An explanation is that in the model part of the 
landing aircraft have sufficient height to fly over the taxiing aircraft at the 
threshold position. 
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Figure 4: Collision risk graphs for variations of parameters as explained in the main text. 
Each graph shows the total risk and the conditional risks given the visibility conditions. 
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5 BIAS AND UNCERTAINTY ASSESSMENT 
5.1 METHODS 
By definition, any model differs from reality. As an integrated part of TOPAZ, a 
bias and uncertainty assessment method has been developed [8],[18]. This 
method supports identification of differences between the DRM and reality, and 
subsequent evaluation of the bias and uncertainty in the risk outcomes due to 
these differences. It consists of the following steps: 
1. Identify all potential differences between the simulation model and reality. 
During the development of a dynamic risk model assumptions are adopted 
and explicitly written down. The parameter assumptions regard the values 
adopted for all parameters of the DRM, e.g. values of event probabilities, 
moments of probability distributions, geometry data, etc. The non-parameter 
assumptions regard all other assumptions, e.g. the types of situation 
awareness of an agent, the decision strategies of agents, the types of 
probability distributions, the representation of the dynamic performance of 
agents, the representation of all hazards in the model, etc. All assumptions 
are potential differences between the DRM and reality. 
2. Assess the size/probability of each difference. For each difference it is 
assessed how large it is or how often it may happen. For each parameter 
value a 95% uncertainty interval is assessed by the median and the size of the 
interval; this median may be biased with respect to the parameter value. In 
support of this assessment, the following ordered categories of the sizes of 
bias factors and uncertainty intervals are used: Neutral, Negligible, Small, 
Minor, Significant, Considerable, Major. These categories reflect differences 
of less than about 10% to more than about a factor 10. For each non-
parameter assumption, the probability is assessed that the assumption 
reflects a difference with respect to reality. 
3. Assess the risk sensitivity for changes in parameter values. The normalized 
sensitivities of the risk outcomes of the DRM for changes in the parameter 
values are assessed. This assessment may be done by a DRM expert using 
knowledge of the model and qualitative sensitivity categories (Negligible, 
Small, Minor, etc.). For critical parameters it is done by additional Monte 
Carlo simulations in which the effects of parameter variations are explicitly 
evaluated. 
4. Assess the effect of each difference on the risk outcome. The uncertainty 
interval of each parameter value is combined with the risk sensitivity to find 
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the uncertainty interval in the risk for the parameter value considered. The 
effect on the risk uncertainty interval can only be large if the parameter 
uncertainty interval and the risk sensitivity are sufficiently large. For each 
non-parameter assumption, a conditional risk bias given that it represents a 
difference, is assessed. The probability that the difference exists and the 
conditional risk bias are combined to a risk bias for each difference.  
5. Determine the joint effects of all differences. The assessment results for all 
individual differences are combined via bias and uncertainty assessment 
methods [8],[18] to best estimates of the risk and its uncertainty interval. 
 
Details of above steps in the preliminary risk assessment of the TIPH scenario are 
as follows.  
• For project-related reasons, it was decided to restrict the bias and uncertainty 
assessment to the parameter value assumptions. This implies that a 
systematic assessment of the non-parameter assumptions is out of the scope 
of this study and that the risk results are to be considered preliminary. 
• A first assessment phase was performed by the safety modelling experts. 
Here the uncertainty interval and risk sensitivity of all 168 parameters were 
assessed, leading to an assessment of their effect on the risk for each 
parameter. This assessment was done conservatively, in order to not falsely 
judge the risk uncertainty as being too low. The result of this phase is a list 
of 118 parameters with a Neutral or Negligible risk effect and a list of 50 
parameters with a (potentially) more than Negligible effect on the risk. 
• For all parameters that had been assessed in the first phase to have a more 
than Negligible risk effect, a second assessment of the parameter uncertainty 
interval was performed. For most parameters, this was done based on 
structured feedback of operational experts, for some parameters searches in 
the literature and safety databases were performed. The feedback of 
operational experts was obtained via questionnaires and interviews. The 
questions asked relate to the performance of pilots, controllers and systems 
in normal circumstances as well as in the specific context of the conflict 
scenario. In this study we obtained feedback from two airline pilots, two 
active air traffic controllers and one former air traffic controller. 
• For all parameters that had been assessed in the first phase to have a more 
than Negligible risk effect, dedicated Monte Carlo simulations were 
performed to assess the risk sensitivity more precisely. 
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5.2 RESULTS 
In the bias and uncertainty assessment, we assessed the uncertainty interval of 
each parameter value, the risk sensitivity of each parameter value and the 
combined effect on the risk uncertainty level. The 95% uncertainty interval of the 
total risk that follows from this assessment is [2.16E-10, 1.35E-6], i.e. the total 
risk resides with 95% probability in an interval from a factor 79 below to a factor 
79 above the point estimate of the risk. 
 
Table 6 shows the parameters with the most important contributions to the risk 
uncertainty and risk sensitivity. It can be seen in this table that there are four 
parameters with a risk uncertainty contribution being Major or Considerable. The 
uncertainty in these parameters contributes to the risk uncertainty interval being 
a factor 36 above and below the risk point estimate; all other parameters 
contribute only an additional factor 2.2.  
• Both the probability and the mean duration of a false track of the landing 
aircraft have a large risk sensitivity (see Figure 4a,b) and a large effect on the 
risk uncertainty. The large risk sensitivity is due to a combination of 
contributions: (1) the considered type of false track (past the waiting aircraft) 
leads to dimming of the stopbar, (2) it implies that no runway incursion alert 
is specified to either of the aircraft and (3) it implies that the landing aircraft 
is falsely positioned on the CDTI of the taxiing aircraft. We obtained feedback 
from a controller that false tracks are quite common and occur almost daily 
in some form; he did however not know cases of the particular false track 
situation considered. We did not have access to radar track data or failure 
reports. The large uncertainty about these false tracks is reflected in the 
assessment. 
• The visual monitoring performance of the pilots of the taxiing aircraft has a 
large effect on the uncertainty in the risk level. The two pilots that we 
interviewed had quite contrasting opinions: one of the pilots argued that 
during lining-up the pilots very regularly monitor the traffic situation, 
whereas the other pilot argued that given that the pilots think that lining-up 
is allowed and safe (i.e. an aircraft is approaching at sufficient distance) then 
the pilots would no longer look to the movement of the approaching aircraft. 
We consider both approaches to be plausible and therefore regard the 
monitoring performance to be very uncertain. As follows from Figure 4c, the 
risk sensitivity for the monitoring performance is quite large, especially in 
visibility condition 1, where the pilots have the possibility to well perceive a 
conflict at an early stage. 
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• The pilots of the landing aircraft need to decide when they regard the taxiing 
aircraft as so conflicting that they will initiate a missed approach. Both 
interviewed pilots indicated that the taxiing aircraft would certainly be 
recognized as conflicting if its nose would be at the runway edge. They 
differed in opinion about the maximum distance where the conflict situation 
would be recognized: one of the pilots argued that the aircraft would 
certainly not be recognized as conflicting if it would be at more than 50 m 
from the runway edge, while the other pilot argued that it might already be 
recognized as conflicting if it would have passed the position of the remotely 
controlled stopbar (at 153 m from the runway centre-line). As follows from 
Figure 4d the risk is very sensitive for this decision distance, especially in 
visibility condition 1.  
 
Table 6: Parameters with a risk sensitivity or risk uncertainty of Significant or more. 
Parameter Explanation 
Parameter 
uncertainty 
Risk 
sensitivity 
Risk 
uncertainty 
FTL
Surv,ATCp  
Probability of false 
track of landing aircraft 
in ATC surveillance 
system 
Major Significant Major 
FTL,nom
Surv,ATCµ  
Mean duration of false 
track of landing aircraft 
in ATC surveillance 
system 
Significant Major Major 
Mon,vis
Pl,Tµ  
Mean time until next 
SA update via visual 
monitoring by the 
pilots of the taxiing 
aircraft 
Major Significant Major 
conflict,T
Pl,Ld  
Distance of the taxiing 
aircraft to the runway 
centre-line within which 
it is recognized as 
conflicting by the pilots 
of the landing aircraft 
Significant Considerable Considerable 
min,ac-L
TIPHy  
Minimum distance of 
landing aircraft to 
runway threshold such 
that TIPH may be 
initiated 
Minor Significant Minor 
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Parameter Explanation 
Parameter 
uncertainty 
Risk 
sensitivity 
Risk 
uncertainty 
stop,ac-T
Pl,Td  
Minimum distance of 
the taxiing aircraft in 
front of the runway 
where the pilots of the 
taxiing aircraft initiate 
stopping 
Minor Significant Minor 
,line-up
Pl,T
vµ
 
Mean taxi speed during 
line-up 
Small Considerable Minor 
ac,T
RIA,ATCd  
Threshold distance of 
taxiing aircraft w.r.t. 
runway centre-line for 
runway incursion alert 
activation 
Small Significant Small 
hold
AC,Tp  
Probability that taxiing 
aircraft initiates the 
runway line-up from 
hold 
Negligible Significant Negligible 
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6 RISK TOLERABILITY, SAFETY BOTTLENECKS 
AND MITIGATING MEASURES 
In Step 6 of the safety risk assessment cycle the risk tolerability is assessed by 
comparing the risk results with the risk criteria. Table 7 shows this comparison 
for the preliminary risk results obtained and the adopted target level of safety 
(TLS). It is manifest that the risk point estimates and a large part of the risk 
uncertainty interval are well above the TLS; only the lower bound of the risk 
uncertainty interval of the total risk is a bit below the TLS. Given the preliminary 
nature of the risk assessment results, we assess the risk to be potentially 
unacceptable. 
 
Table 7: Comparison of preliminary risk assessment results with the target level of safety 
for Scenario 1 of the TIPH.  
Risk metric Risk value Factor w.r.t. TLS 
Target level of safety 1.1E-9 1 
Risk point estimate for VC1 1.46E-8 13.3 
Risk point estimate for VC2 4.64E-8 42.2 
Risk point estimate for VC3/4 1.32E-7 120 
Point estimate of total risk 1.71E-8 15.5 
95% Uncertainty interval of total risk [2.16E-10, 1.35E-6] [0.196, 1230] 
 
In Step 7 of the safety risk assessment cycle the main sources contributing to 
unacceptable safety levels are identified; these sources are entitled ‘safety 
bottlenecks’. Since we assessed the risk as potentially unacceptable, we 
identified potential safety bottlenecks. The derivation of the potential safety 
bottlenecks is based on the largest risk contributions of Table 4 and the 
parameters with the risk sensitivity or risk uncertainty being at least 
Considerable in Table 6. The potential safety bottlenecks based on these highest 
ranking risk results are the following ones. 
• False surveillance data of the landing aircraft may cause false automatic 
switching of the stopbar and non-functioning of the runway incursion alert 
system. 
• Pilots may not continue monitoring for potential conflicts after they started 
taxiing into position. 
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• Pilots may decide to initiate a missed approach only if they observe that a 
taxiing aircraft is very close to the runway. 
• The taxi speed during line-up may be too high. 
 
The results of the safety risk assessment cycle, including the accident risk levels, 
the risk sensitivities, the risk tolerability’s and the safety bottlenecks, support 
further development of the TIPH operational concept. As an onset, a brainstorm 
was organized to identify mitigating measures that have the potential to reduce 
the risk levels assessed. The workshop started with a presentation of the main 
safety findings identified and the brainstorm was structured by the four safety 
bottlenecks presented above. The brainstorm participants included pilots, 
controllers, A-SMGCS experts, HF experts and safety experts, and they were 
asked to come up with ideas on potential mitigating measures in a joint session. 
After the brainstorm session, the arguments provided were structured in 
potential risk mitigations. For each of these potential risk mitigations, an initial 
assessment was done, including a discussion of its potential advantages and 
disadvantages [16]. In summary, the following potential risk mitigating measures 
were identified: 
1. The flight crew of the landing aircraft will broadcast by radio “[ID] 
TOUCHDOWN RWY[xx]”, once the aircraft has completed the flare and 
touchdown and the crew has reasonable certainty that it has passed any 
other aircraft on holding points for that runway. 
2. Install one or more devices at the airport of which the position is known and 
that constantly transmit as if they were actual targets. The system will be 
required to continuously check the position of these devices in order to 
detect failures in both the surveillance subsystems and the data processing 
system, and alert the actors. 
3. Manual switch-off of the stopbar lights by ATC. 
4. Change the existing procedure for the taking-off aircraft that starts the TIPH 
procedure, to delay the execution of the departure/take-off checklist until 
lining-up has been completed. Do not execute the checklist while you are 
lining-up, continue to monitor for other traffic instead. Start with the 
checklist only when it is absolutely useless to continue to verify that you are 
free of conflicts. 
5. Require the A-SMGCS level 3 system to: 
• Be able to identify when the holding aircraft has initiated the line-up or 
has surpassed the safe distance to the runway in case the aircraft has 
surpassed the holding point;  
• Automatically transmit clear unambiguous information to the actors (ATC 
and flight crews).  
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6. Introduce additional sensors around runway entry points (pressure, 
volumetric, noise, etc.). 
7. Add additional display/representation of information on cockpit for landing 
aircraft. 
8. Obligate the taking-off aircraft to make a full-stop before being able to 
initiate the TIPH procedure.  
9. The taking-off aircraft will broadcast “[ID/AC] Entering RWY XX” to signal any 
other aircraft, especially landing aircraft, when they are going to start the 
TIPH procedure. 
10. Use independent data for automatic switching of the stopbar lights and the 
surveillance of the traffic. For instance, radar and LMAT data may be used for 
the automatic switching of the stopbar lights, whereas aircraft navigation 
data may be shared between involved aircraft by ADS-B and this shared data 
may be the basis for the on-board generation of a runway incursion alert; this 
alert may also be down-linked to ATC.  
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7 DISCUSSION 
In this paper we presented a risk assessment of a novel air traffic operation 
based on dynamic risk modelling. In contrast with conventional fault and event 
trees-based risk assessment, the applied dynamic risk model explicitly 
represents the stochastic dynamic performance of a variety of interacting agents 
in an air traffic scenario, the variability of the agents’ performance and the 
emergence of accidents in Monte Carlo simulations of the dynamic risk model. 
The stochastic dynamic performance of the agents considers a wide scope of 
aspects, including aircraft flight and taxiing performance, situation awareness 
updating and decision making by pilots, and the performance of A-SMGCS 
systems in nominal and non-nominal conditions. As would also be the case in 
fault/event tree analysis, the dynamic risk model includes a variety of event 
probabilities, for instance for the probability of events such as non-functioning of 
technical systems and pilot errors. In addition to such event probabilities and in 
contrast to the parameters used in fault/event tree analysis, the dynamic risk 
model includes a large number of other parameters related to performance 
aspects such as aircraft dynamics, timing of situation awareness updating, timing 
of communication, accuracy and timing of surveillance systems, decision making 
by pilots and A-SMGCS alert settings. Typically, such parameters can be 
interpreted and reflected on by operational and design experts more easily than 
event probabilities. This was also confirmed in the feedback obtained from pilots 
and controllers that contributed to this safety case. 
 
The risk results presented in this paper are to be regarded as preliminary, since 
the design of the TIPH operation is at an early stage and no assessment of the 
non-parameter assumptions has been performed. For instance, a limitation of the 
developed DRM is that the runway controller has not yet been included. In the 
context of the risk assessment, it implies that the assumption ‘The runway 
controller has no effect on the prevention of an accident in the conflict scenario’ 
would have to be assessed. Here it would have to be assessed how and when the 
controller might recognize and react to the conflict, and in what number of cases 
the controller might warn the pilots of one or both aircraft before the pilots have 
already recognized the conflict themselves independently. Although this 
assumption can be classified as being safety conservative, the risk reduction as 
result of controller performance might well be quite limited. Reasons are that the 
contribution of the controller was found to be very small in good visibility in 
other runway incursion scenarios [20]  and that both the pilots and the controller 
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use the same surveillance and alert data in all visibility conditions, thus limiting 
the potential added contribution of the controller. 
 
The results obtained show that the risk point estimates and a large part of the 
risk uncertainty interval are above the adopted target level of safety for the 
conflict scenario considered in the particular design of the A-SMGCS level 3 
supported taxi into position and hold operation. In addition to the risk 
tolerability results, the assessment provided detailed feedback on the 
contributions of conditions, systems and humans to the accident risk of the 
conflict scenario considered. Key safety insights for the TIPH operation are: 
• By far the largest risk contribution stems from the situation concerning a 
false track of the landing aircraft that is positioned past the line-up position: 
as a result the stopbar is switched off, the runway incursion alert does not 
become active and the landing aircraft is not shown properly on the CDTI of 
the taxiing aircraft. 
• The functioning of the runway incursion alert system in combination with the 
up-linking of the alert data has a very large effect on the accident risk. When 
functioning properly these systems largely reduce the accident risk. Their risk 
reducing effect is larger than was assessed previously for a conflict between 
aircraft taxiing and taking off [20]. 
• The conditional accident risks increase considerably in poorer visibility 
conditions and the dependability on the proper functioning of the technical 
systems is very high in poor visibility. 
 
In this study a total of ten potential measures were identified that aim to mitigate 
the safety bottlenecks and to reduce the accident risk in the conflict scenario. 
These ten potential mitigating measures provide a good opportunity to improve 
the TIPH design. The effectiveness of these mitigating measures may be assessed 
in one or more additional risk assessment cycles until it is decided that the risk 
of the operation is acceptable. In this way, safety targets for future operations 
envisioned in design programmes as SESAR and NextGen can be controlled 
systematically, such that also next generations of passengers can keep having 
safe flights back home.  
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